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Abstract
The authors advocate the addition of two preventative strategies to the current United State’s guidelines for the
prevention of surgical site infections. It is known that Staphylococcus aureus, including Methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), carriers are at a higher risk for the development of infections and they can easily
transmit the organism. The carriage rate of Staph. aureus in the general population approximates 33%. The CDC
estimates the carriage rate of MRSA in the United States is approximately 2%. The first strategy is preoperative
screening of surgical patients for Staph. aureus, including MRSA. This recommendation is based upon the growing literature
which shows a benefit in both prevention of infections and guidance in preoperative antibiotic selection. The
second is performing MRSA active surveillance screening on healthcare workers. The carriage rate of MRSA in
healthcare workers approximates 5% and there are concerns of transmission of this pathogen to patients. MRSA
decolonization of healthcare workers has been reported to approach a success rate of 90%. Healthcare workers
colonized with dangerous pathogens, including MRSA, should be assigned to non-patient contact work areas. In
addition, there needs to be implemented a safety net for both the worker’s economic security and healthcare.
Finally, a reporting system for the healthcare worker acquisition and infections with dangerous pathogens needs to be
implemented. These recommendations are needed because Staph. aureus including MRSA is endemic in the United
States. Policies regarding endemic pathogens which are to be implemented only upon the occurrence of a facility
defined “outbreak” have to be questioned, since absence of infections does not mean absence of transmission.
Optimizing these policies will require further research but until then we should error on the side of patient safety.
Commentary
The emergence of multi-drug resistant organisms presents
new challenges for the prevention of surgical site infec-
tions (SSI). In July of 2017, the CDC issued additional
guidance on preventative strategies [1]. However, there
remain a number of important gaps in the prevention of
spread of Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
(MRSA) and other multi-drug resistant drug organisms.
There is mounting evidence regarding the importance
of assessing the patient’s microbiome for improved treat-
ments and prevention of hospital acquired infections [2].
In the future, characterizing a patient’s commensal and
pathogenic bacteria may become common place and prac-
tical from both an economic and logistical standpoint. Pres-
ently, there is readily available technology to at least screen
patients and healthcare workers for dangerous pathogens.
Two additional standards should be adopted to prevent
SSI: 1) Preoperative screening and decolonization for
Staph. aureus, including MRSA in patients and 2) screen-
ing and decolonization of MRSA in healthcare workers,
along with the implementation of an event reporting sys-
tem and the development of protocols for financial and
healthcare protection.
Screening of Staph. aureus to prevent surgical site infections
Staph. aureus is a common pathogen which causes post-
operative infections [3]. It has been demonstrated that
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between 26 to 37% of patients are Staph. aureus carriers
[4–6] and that these carriers have higher rates of SSIs
[3, 7]. Decolonization has been shown to be effective in
decreasing Staph aureus SSIs [3, 4, 8].
Although not widely performed in the United States,
WHO has recently recommended decolonization of Staph.
aureus carriers for the prevention of SSI, with preoperative
patient screening to implement this intervention. This is a
strong recommendation for cardiothoracic and orthopedic
surgery and a moderate conditional recommendation
“when feasible” because of costs for other types of surgery
[3]. Similar to the United Kingdom’s National Health
Service, [9] the United States has the financial resources
to implement this policy on all surgical patients.
Screening of MRSA to prevent surgical site infections
In the United States, screening is not routinely performed
for Staph. aureus in preoperative patients, and there has
even been reluctance to screen for the more resistant
form of Staph. aureus, MRSA. A major concern regard-
ing MRSA is the continued progression and spread of
antibiotic resistance, with additional resistance developing
to vancomycin and other antibiotics. In addition, there is
mounting evidence regarding increase virulence through
genetic acquisition and expression [10, 11]. However, there
has been abundant research regarding the mechanisms of
spread and strategies to control the spread of MRSA, along
with analysis of the resistance to setting firm standards to
stop this epidemic.
In the United States, screening for MRSA fell out of
popularity in part due to a study published in JAMA by
Harbarth, et al. [12]. However, this study was poorly
implemented as antibiotics active against MRSA were
not administered to 57% of patients known to be MRSA
carriers preoperatively (30% of the total number of pa-
tients). In 31% of the total patients, the MRSA cultures
were not available until after the surgery [12]. However,
the data also indicated that MRSA carriers were over 14
times more likely to develop a postoperative MRSA infec-
tion than non-carriers (Chi Squire with Yates Correction,
p < 0.0001).
Since, the study by Harbarth, et al. [12] was published,
Kavanagh, et al. [13] reviewed 19 studies that indicated a
beneficial effect of preoperative MRSA screening, 14
studies reached statistical significance. A wide range of
patients were studied including patients in intensive care,
and those undergoing vascular, orthopedic, gynecologic,
gastrostomy, head and neck, and cardiac surgeries. The vast
majority of these studies used pre-post designs and had
non-concurrent controls; however, the large number of
studies that showed positive effects of pre-operative MRSA
screening outweighs the effects of random unknown vari-
ables in the pre-post studies [13].
Preoperative knowledge of the MRSA status of surgical
patients allows for both the proper selection of preoperative
antibiotics and in elective surgical patients, implementation
of a preoperative decolonization protocol. MRSA carriers
are often prophylaxed with vancomycin or teicoplanin as
opposed to a cephalosporin. There is evidence that the
use of vancomycin in non-MRSA carriers may lead to
an increase in post-surgical infections [14]. In addition,
Branch-Elliman, et al., concluded that vancomycin usage
in cardiac patients was associated with an increased risk
of acute kidney injury and concluded that its risks in
MRSA negative patients outweighs its benefits [15].
The following studies have focused on MRSA and sup-
port the policies for screening for this pathogen:
 MRSA is highly infectious, and carriers have been
observed to spread the organism to the environment
at a higher rate than those with infections [16].
 It has been observed that 35% of MRSA colonized
patients can contaminate their environment within
33 h [17] and once contaminated, surfaces may
be MRSA culture positive for up to one to two
months [18].
 The CDC estimates that the United States’ general
population has a carrier rate of 2% [19].
 Multiple studies found a higher carrier rate in
healthcare workers. On average, the rate approaches
5% [20, 21].
 Albrich and Harbarth found 79 studies that support
the spread of MRSA from healthcare workers to
patients [20].
 MRSA carriers are at an increased risk for MRSA
infections [22].
 The fatality rate for MSA bloodstream infections
approximates 16% [23].
In the United States, MRSA bloodstream infections
are not on track to meeting the 2020 goals of a 50% re-
duction, there is some evidence that in 2015 these infec-
tions may have even increased [24].
Transmission of staph aureus and MRSA from healthcare
workers to patients
MRSA is endemic in the United States. The CDC esti-
mates that 2% of the general population are carriers [19]
and according to the CDDEP 43% of outpatient Staph.
aureus cultures are oxacillin resistant (2012 data) [25].
So why has there not been more research directed at
healthcare worker colonization?
It has been demonstrated that healthcare workers can
transmit Staph. aureus to patients. Price JR, et al. demon-
strated that out of 25 instances of patient acquisition of
Staph. aureus, seven were from healthcare workers [5].
Albrich and Harbarth reviewed 68 articles which performed
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genotyping on colonized and infected healthcare
workers and found that 93% had likely transmission from
healthcare worker to patient [20]. And, at least one study
has reported a decrease in the incidence of MRSA with the
identification and treatment of healthcare workers [26].
There is also no reason to believe that transmission of
MRSA will differ between different groups of individuals
and would be expected to carry equal risks in the general
public, patients and healthcare workers. Cadena, et al.
observed that patients who are MRSA carriers and are
diabetics, on dialysis, or undergoing surgery are at a higher
risk for developing MRSA infections than non-carriers [22].
Unlike, the general public, healthcare workers come into
contact with some of the most frail and susceptible individ-
uals and thus, prevention of spread should be imperative.
Protocols for screening and decolonization
The protocol commonly used for Staph. aureus decolonization
is daily body washes with an antiseptic for five days
plus an intranasal antibiotic ointment, given three times
a day. For MRSA positive patients, 2% mupirocin is
often applied intranasally; for MSSA positive patients,
Naseptin Nasal Cream (chlorhexidine hydrochloride 0.1%;
neomycin sulfate 0.5%) can be used [27]. Eradication of
the MRSA carrier state was achieved in up to 88% of
healthcare workers [20]. Universal decolonization of all
patients or healthcare personnel regardless of their carrier
state should be avoided because of the potential to spread
resistance [3, 28].
Similar to patients, the healthcare worker poses a risk
of spreading pathogens to the environment. Healthcare
employers should not assign healthcare workers in pa-
tient contact areas while they are carriers of dangerous
pathogens. We feel this policy should apply to MRSA
carriers not only because of the pathogen’s resistance to
antibiotics but also because of concerns regarding in-
crease virulence [3, 10, 11].
Health policy decisions
During the July 2017 Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention’s Healthcare Infection Control Practices
Advisory Committee (HICPAC) meeting, the committee
discussed the topic of MRSA control as it relates to health-
care workers. Under consideration was a recommendation
to screen healthcare workers during an MRSA outbreak.
Endemic or outbreak
The occurrence of an “Outbreak” is often used to trigger
increased infection control and prevention protocols.
However, in the United States, an “outbreak” is often de-
fined as a rate of infections above a facility defined base-
line. Thus, daily MRSA infections could theoretically be
occurring and neither patients, the health department or
oversight agencies would be notified of an outbreak in
the facility. It all depends upon how many infections it
takes to be greater than the facility defined baseline.
Thus, we should not guide our actions around the
non-standardized term of “outbreak”. We agree with Albrich
and Harbarth [20] whose findings support not restricting
screening of MRSA to outbreaks in endemic settings.
There is little doubt that MRSA has become endemic
in the United States. The absence of an outbreak does
not mean there is absence of exposure or transmission;
it does not even mean there have been no infections.
Our perspective on MRSA and interventions to mitigate
it, need to undergo a transformative paradigm shift.
The healthcare worker
Many categories of healthcare workers contact patients
on multiple types of wards. In addition, the increasing
trend of “cross-training” of nurses and the use of tempor-
ary nurses to save costs, results in the same personnel
being assigned to different types of wards. Thus, policies
relating to healthcare workers should be facility wide.
The reason for not adopting protocols for readily iden-
tifying and controlling pathogen in healthcare workers
may lie in conflict-of-interest in the healthcare industry.
Detection and decolonization may have a negative finan-
cial impact on institutions. All too often, the healthcare
worker is put at risk because well-defined occupational
safety and healthcare standards for infection control
have not been established. Part of this dilemma is the
lack of research. By not investigating, a call to action
regarding the healthcare workers, along with the health
of patients, has been severely mitigated and the develop-
ment of effective protocols to reduce post-surgical infec-
tion rates have been hampered. At the same time difficult
and costly decisions have been avoided.
In addition, the United States does not have a national
surveillance system for the tracking of healthcare worker
acquisition and infections with dangerous pathogens. This
results in cases not being recorded and classified as work
related. Healthcare staff will often use sick leave or work
while ill. Additionally, there is a concern regarding health-
care workers bringing antibiotic resistant pathogens home
to their families. Once MRSA is transmitted into a house-
hold environment, without further intervention, it may
persist for 2.33 to 8.55 years [29].
Need for better standards
The lack of effective standards for the protection of
healthcare workers is not restricted to MRSA. The Ebola
epidemic underscored the inadequacy of hospital pre-
paredness to deal with dangerous pathogens. On Aug 7,
2014, assurances were given to the U.S. House Foreign
Affairs Subcommittee that healthcare facilities in the
United States are trained in and had protocols in place
to handle Ebola [30]. However, by October of that year,
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two healthcare workers became infected and it became
evident that safety protocols were inadequate and that only
a few special biocontainment facilities in the United States
could handle patients with highly contagious diseases.
Although MRSA is not as deadly as Ebola, it is highly
infectious. According to the Centers of Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC), the number of deaths in the
United States from MRSA is at least 11,000 each year
and there are over 80,000 severe infections [31]. These
statistics demonstrate the urgency of improving practices
for the protection of patients and staff from MRSA and
other multi-drug resistant pathogens. The hospital cost
of treating MRSA patients is between $3.2 and $4.2 bil-
lion [32]. This expenditure demonstrates that improved
infection prevention strategies, such as those proposed
in this paper, can have direct healthcare dollar savings
plus improve performance and reimbursement with
CMS’s value-based purchasing initiatives.
Policy recommendations
The following policies should be enacted:
1. The screening of patients and healthcare workers
for dangerous pathogens, including MRSA, to
mitigate the changes of spread to other patients,
staff and the community.
2. Establish a surveillance system for healthcare
workers to determine the extent of occupational
acquisition and infections of dangerous pathogens,
including MRSA.
3. Establish an economic and healthcare safety net
for healthcare workers who become infected or
colonized with dangerous pathogens, including
MRSA.
4. Research to promote effective screening and
decolonization of healthcare workers for dangerous
pathogens, including MRSA.
5. Assessing the effectiveness of the diverse current
practices in the healthcare industry in order to
implement standardized prevention strategies,
including screening protocols. For example, the
comparing of the results of the MRSA prevention
protocols in the U.S. Veterans Health
Administration's healthcare system with those of
private industry [24].
In the United States, increased vigilance is necessary.
Data is not available for many types of infections, but for
MRSA bloodstream infections the data indicates that
they may not be coming under control. Data from the
National Healthcare Safety Network indicated that MRSA
infections increased between 2014 to 2015 and that we are
not on track to meet the national goal of a 50% reduction
in MRSA bloodstream infections by 2020 [24].
Conclusion
Many now believe that knowledge of a patient’s micro-
biome will one day be essential for the maintenance of
good health and may even become a part of a yearly phys-
ical exam. Until resources are available to accomplish this,
we should at a minimum initiative screening of surgical
patients for Staph. aureus, including MRSA. Similar to the
United Kingdom’s National Health Service, [9] the United
States has the resources to implement the WHO recom-
mendations [3] regarding the screening of all surgical pa-
tients for Staph. aureus.
The United States also need to implement programs for
periodic screening of all healthcare workers, including sur-
gical staff, for the resistant form of Staph. aureus, MRSA.
Healthcare workers who are positive should be decolonize
and whenever possible assigned to nonpatient contact
areas until decolonization is complete. Decolonization of
healthcare workers is highly successful with 88% MRSA
eradication [20]. Work reassignment programs need to
protect affected worker's job and income status and should
be an essential component of the policy.
The gaps we have addressed deserve more research in-
cluding the risks a colonized healthcare worker poses to
patients, the number of healthcare workers exposed and
infected occupationally, and the development of effective
healthcare worker occupational infectious disease surveil-
lance programs. Nevertheless, current evidence indicates
that colonization with dangerous pathogens is a critical
issue which has the potential of causing grave harm. The
existence of research gaps does not mean we should not
act, because not acting is in itself an action. It is our duty
to deliver patient centered care of the highest quality and
until we know a practice, or an inaction is safe, we must
error on the side of patient and healthcare worker safety.
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